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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the impact of epidemics on economic behavior, and in par-
ticular on fertility and schooling. Special attention is paid to the fertility e￿ect, which has
been at the heart of a recent controversy around the AIDS crisis. An illustrative model
is proposed where agents choose labor supply, life-cycle consumption and the number of
children. We show that the optimal response in terms of fertility and labor supply to an
epidemic shock depends on the relative strength of two forces at work, deriving from: (i)
the induced decrease in the survival probability, and (ii) the impact of epidemics on wages.
A comprehensive empirical study is then proposed to disentangle the latter e￿ects in the
HIV/AIDS and malaria cases. Using data from 69 developing countries over the period
1980-2004, we ￿nd that HIV/AIDS has a robust negative e￿ect on fertility and a robust
positive e￿ect on education, while opposite results are found in the case of malaria. We
argue that this discrepancy can be attributed to a sizeable wage e￿ect in the AIDS case
while such an e￿ect is rather negligible under malaria at least in the short term, as higher
malaria prevalence depresses wages in the long term.
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Recently, a controversy has been taking place around the fertility impact of HIV/AIDS. While
the study of Young (2005a) concerning the South-African case has concluded that the epidemic is
decreasing fertility, Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) has identi￿ed the opposite e￿ect on a panel of African
countries over the 1985-2000 period.1 An argument often brought forward is that the sexual
transmission of such an epidemic would naturally induce a sort of sexual behavior adjustment
(more protected relationships, more contraception) which should drive fertility down. However,
Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) reviews the medical literature and concludes that uninfected people, or
people believing not to be infected, do not modify their fertility-related behaviors: indeed, in the
African case, numerous social and political circumstances are particulary unfavorable to aware-
ness of HIV/AIDS (World Bank, 1997). On the other hand, Young (2005b) argues that fertility
can drop under HIV/AIDS because this epidemic may induce changes in both sexual and con-
traceptive behaviors. He uses microdata of Sub-Saharan African countries and econometrically
￿nds that higher HIV prevalence leads to an increased use of all forms of contraception, sug-
gesting that the behavioral changes induced by the epidemics may not only re￿ect a willingness
to reduce unprotected sexual activity but also to purposely control fertility. The main economic
mechanism put forward to explain this change in individual behaviors is highly interesting: the
desire of women to have less children may be driven by a rise in the opportunity cost of rearing
them. Thus, at the heart of Young’s argument lies the idea that similarly to what occurred dur-
ing the Black Death in the fourteenth century, the heavy labor shortage induced by epidemics
like HIV/AIDS should have a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on wages, which might well raise female
participation in the labor market and ultimately lead to a lower fertility. Set in more theoretical
terms in line with Kremer and Chen (2002), it might be the case that the substitution e￿ect in-
duced by higher wages (lowering fertility through the rising opportunity cost of rearing children)
ends up dominating the income e￿ect (increasing fertility through a higher amount of resources
available to bring up children).
On the other hand, Kalemli-Ozcan’s argument is tightly linked to the so-called insurance e￿ect
deriving from an increasing uncertainty about children’s survival to the adult age (see a related
theory in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002)). The perception of an increasing infant mortality may generate
a rationale for increasing the number of o￿springs. It is already clear that such an argument is
1Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) has nevertheless stressed that South-Africa may be a speci￿c case in her empirical
study, evoking a ￿weak negative relation between HIV/AIDS and the total fertility rate￿ (p.19).likely to be relevant when the epidemic kills or is supposed to kill a large number of children,
which is indisputably the case of malaria. However, epidemics like HIV/AIDS or the Spanish
￿u (see Brainerd and Siegler (2003) for example) tend to kill many more adults than children.2
Such a massive adult mortality implies a sizeable labor supply shortage, which in turn gives rise
to the wage e￿ect discussed above. While this e￿ect is at the heart of Young’s appraisal, it is
not at all disentangled in Kalemli-Ozcan’s empirical assessment. We argue in this paper that
the behavioral impact of epidemics cannot be ￿nely apprehended by only considering decreasing
survival rates, whether it be for adults or children. As far as one is concerned with fertility and
educational choices under epidemics, the wage e￿ect should be accurately isolated. We will show
that such a distinction between mortality and wage e￿ects could be most useful and decisive to
understand the impact of epidemics on economic behavior in general, and to get through the
current fertility debate around the HIV/AIDS crisis in particular.
We shall proceed in two steps. We ￿rst present a simple overlapping generations model depicting
the individual behavior modi￿cations in response to an epidemic shock, taking into account the
two distinct e￿ects outlined just above: on one hand, the sharp decrease in survival probabilities,
and on the other hand a dramatic shortage in labor supply, leading to an increase in real wages.
We show that while a decrease in the survival probability always leads to higher fertility and
lower labor supply, a positive shock on wages can generate the exact opposite consequences,
reducing fertility and raising labor supply. The main mechanism lying behind the ￿wage e￿ect￿
at work in our model is exactly the one pointed out by Young (2005a): higher wages increase the
opportunity cost of rearing children and can therefore decrease fertility. Actually our model can
be seen as a reasonable combination between his static model and the overlapping generations
setting proposed by Zhang and Zhang (2005). The ￿mortality e￿ect￿ inherent to our theory stems
from the diminishing need for life-cycle consumption with respect to fertility. A lower survival
probability to the senior age decreases the need for life-cycle consumption and increases the
desired number of o￿springs. Clearly this is neither the infant mortality e￿ect nor the insurance
mechanism outlined by Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) but it yields exactly the same outcome, opposite to
the wage e￿ect under certain conditions that will be speci￿ed along the way. Hence, our simple
model perfectly illustrates that, in the presence of the two competing e￿ects described above,
the overall impact of an epidemic shock on fertility (and on labor supply) is not straightforward,
2Recent demographic projections (see for example, the 2004 UNAIDS annual report) are nevertheless showing
quite an alarming trend for HIV-related infant mortality in some Sub-Saharan African countries for the next two
decades. However, it is undisputable that the vast majority of AIDS-related deaths are active adults.
2and primarily depends on the relative strength of the two forces at work. It should be already
noted that for simplicity we do not model explicitly schooling decisions. Of course, one can
straightforwardly ￿gure out the same competing mortality vs wage e￿ects on this decision: lower
life expectancy is associated to lower education through the Ben Porath mechanism (Boucekkine
et al., 2002), while higher wages would induce opposite e￿ects.
In the second step, we conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis to disentangle the impacts of
the two forces in the case of two distinct epidemics: HIV/AIDS and malaria, another infectious
disease plaguing the African world. By checking the behavioral e￿ects of HIV/AIDS on a sample
of 69 developing countries over the 1980-2004 period, and after taking into account outliers,
reverse causality, interdependencies and the potential existence of an African speci￿city, we ￿nd
that a higher HIV prevalence has a negative e￿ect on both life expectancy and fertility, while
it has a positive and robust e￿ect on education. The conjecture that the ￿wage channel￿ seems
to dominate is then further strengthened by testing for the actual impact of the epidemics on
the evolution of wages: we ￿nd that HIV prevalence indeed exerts a positive direct impact on
wages. On the other hand, we ￿nd that malaria, although having as well a negative impact
on life expectancy, has a negative impact on education and a positive e￿ect on fertility. Such
results rather suggest that the wage e￿ect is tenuous under malaria or that malaria has a negative
impact on wages. We ￿nd that malaria has no signi￿cant e￿ect on wages in the short run and
a negative e￿ect in the long run. The lack of short-run impact should not be regarded as a
surprising result since malaria mostly kills children in contrast to AIDS, which massively hits
active adults at ￿rst, and thus a￿ects much more directly labor supply. However, in the long
term, chronic malaria prevalence reduces both economic activity and labor demand, causing a
drop in wages. In addition to the cognitive and learning e￿ects of malaria, this may explain why
educational attainment remains persistently low in countries chronically exposed to malaria.
To summarize, the original contributions of this paper are twofold. On the theoretical ground,
and though our model is illustrative to a large extent, it provides a useful benchmark for the study
of epidemics. As we have already mentioned, the model can be closely linked to the literature
on life expectancy and growth. While a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the relationship
between life expectancy, education and fertility has already been provided by Hazan and Zoabi
(2006), our model contributes to the literature by tackling the problem of behavioral answer to an
epidemic shock and studying in a transparent and tractable way the combined impact of a shorter
survival probability and a positive e￿ect on wages. On the empirical side, the contributions are
3markedly more signi￿cant. In the particular case of HIV/AIDS, we contribute to the fertility
debate. By closely examining the behavioral impacts of shorter lives and higher wages within
the same framework, we are able to integrate the opposite e￿ects on fertility put forward by
Young and Kalemli-Ozcan. Our results con￿rm the intuitions of Young (2005a). Incidentally,
we develop a more global approach to the assessment of behavioral impacts of epidemics by
testing for behavioral consequences of malaria, which broadens the scope of analysis to another
type of epidemics, and exempli￿es possible divergences in the impact on individual behavior of
life-threatening diseases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our simple theoretical model and its pre-
dictions concerning rational behavior under an epidemic shock. Section 3 describes the empirical
tests conducted and reports the results obtained. Section 4 concludes.
2 Rational behavior under epidemics: a simple theory
We start presenting a benchmark model illustrating how individual behaviors could be altered by
epidemic shocks. In order to gather enough ingredients to comprehensively tackle the HIV/AIDS
overall impact on fertility, we shall consider as explained in the introduction that epidemics have
two distinct direct e￿ects on the individuals. First, the ￿mortality e￿ect￿ consists in a decrease
in survival probability of individuals, consistently with decreasing life expectancy patterns as-
sociated with AIDS-like epidemics.3 Second, the ￿wage e￿ect￿ lies in the increase in real wages
induced by the heavy shortage in labor supply resulting from massive epidemics like the Black
Death or AIDS. This positive e￿ect on wages is not only emphasized by Young (2005a) in his
inspection of the South African AIDS tragedy, but is also commonly admitted by sociologists
and historians (Herlihy, 1997) concerning epidemics such as the Black Death.4
In this section, we shall in particular characterize optimal fertility and labor supply behavior
under epidemic shocks triggering the two direct e￿ects mentioned above. The illustrative model
presented here can be seen as a reasonable combination of the Young (2005a) static model and
Zhang and Zhang (2005) overlapping generations model. It is however important to signal right
away that in order to keep this analytical part as algebraically transparent as possible, we don’t
explicitly allow for the traditional trade-o￿ ￿quality vs quantity of children￿ that is present in both
3It goes without saying that such a feature does not ￿t into episodes of short-lived epidemics such as the
Spanish ￿u. See a modeling of the latter in Boucekkine et al. (2007).
4This positive e￿ect on wages is actually even acknowledged by economy textbooks (Mankiw, 2005).
4mentioned models through the educational choices of the parents. For the sake of computational
clarity, we here choose to focus on the fertility decision (quantity of children), not including an
education variable. One should however notice that adding such a trade-o￿ to our theoretical
set-up would simply deliver the typical outcome that in response to the epidemic shocks, parents
move the quality and quantity of children in opposite directions. We hence keep things as simple
as possible, since our aim in this theoretical part is merely illustrative: we wish to isolate as
clearly as possible the respective impacts of the two competing direct e￿ects we identi￿ed on
fertility. In other words, how could fertility and labor supply respond to a simultaneous rise in
wages (￿wage e￿ect￿) and decline in life expectancy (￿mortality e￿ect￿)? Implications for optimal
education decisions will then result quite naturally, as we will see in the concluding sub-section.
2.1 The model
The model is a 3 periods, one good overlapping generations model. An individual born in period
t spends all his time endowment (say one unit of time) of his ￿rst life period (childhood), that is
period t, having leisure. In period t+1, he becomes for sure a young adult (no child mortality). A
young adult consumes ct+1, has nt+1 children, works a proportion lt+1 of his unit time endowment,
paid at an exogenous wage per unit of time wt+1, and saves st+1 for consumption in his old age
(if he survives). As usual, rearing children costs a proportion µnt+1 of time endowed, with µ > 0.
The young adult becomes a senior adult with probability p. A senior adult consumes ct+2 out
of the savings made in t + 1. A classic feature in this kind of framework is then to assume the
existence of an annuity market which guarantees that survivors get the savings plus interests of




As already signaled and justi￿ed, with respect to Zhang and Zhang (2005), one can notice
that we omit schooling and human capital accumulation. Indeed, introducing them would result
in a system of 7 equations as opposed to 5 below: the economic gains from such an extension
are completely overshadowed by the algebraic cost. Instead we choose to stick to a benchmark
model, more adapted to the illustrative purpose of this section. A more fundamental di￿erence
that we will comment now comes from preferences, whose speci￿cation is closer to the spirit of
Beckerian behavioral models such as the one developed by Young (2005a). Indeed, we assume




















where ®i, i = 1;2;3, are strictly positive constants, and ¾c, ¾n and ¾l, are the usual positive
elasticity parameters respectively related to consumption (either ￿young￿ or ￿old￿ consumption),
number of children and leisure.5
Hence, consistently with Young’s static preferences, and since labor supply response to epi-
demic shocks is a fundamental aspect of our paper, we introduce disutility of working (and
rearing children) in the second period of life: young adults enjoy leisure, and working and rear-
ing children reduces their utility. In contrast, Zhang and Zhang (2005) introduce such a leisure
term for children, necessary to their purpose of featuring educational choices.
Finally, the general iso-elastic speci￿cation for utility terms is aimed for generality. As we
shall see later, some important behavioral implications of epidemics do depend on the elasticity
parameters.
The budgetary constraints for periods t + 1 and t + 2 are as follow:









ct+2 = wt+1 lt+1: (3)
Optimal behavior is obtained by maximization of the utility function with respect to the
four decision variables (ct+1;nt+1;lt+1;ct+2) under the constraint (3). The resulting optimization
problem is as follows. Call ¸t+1 the Lagrange multiplier associated to (3). The ￿rst-order
5Of course, in case one of these elasticity parameters is equal to 1, the corresponding utility term becomes
logarithmic.
6conditions with respect to the four variables above in this order are:
c
¡¾c
t+1 = ¸t+1; (4)
µ ®2 (1 ¡ µnt+1 ¡ lt+1)
¡¾l = ®1 n
¡¾n
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Characterizing optimal behavior amounts to solving the system (3) to (7) in the ￿ve variables
(ct+1;nt+1;lt+1;ct+2;¸t+1), all strictly positive, under the time resource constraint, µnt+1+lt+1 <
1, and for given wt+1 and Rt+2. The ￿rst proposition shows that this problem has a unique
solution.
Proposition 1 The system (3) to (7) has a unique solution in (ct+1;nt+1;lt+1;ct+2;¸t+1), all
strictly positive, satisfying µnt+1 + lt+1 < 1.
Proof: Combining (3), (4) and (7), one can ￿nd
ct+1 =
wt+1 lt+1








Now, combining (5) and (6), one gets
®1 n
¡¾n
t+1 = µ ¸t+1 wt+1;

















Now, it is straightforward to see that the proposition is done if we prove that the system (5)-(9)
admits a unique solution in nt+1 and lt+1 satisfying µnt+1 +lt+1 < 1. Using (9) to express lt+1 as
7a function of nt+1, and substituting this function in (5), we get a single equation in nt+1, which
is fundamental to our purposes:
®1 n
¡¾n
t+1 = µ ®2
·
























. Denote by ¹ nt+1, the number of children satisfying









t+1 = 1. On the interval (0; ¹ nt+1),
the left-hand side of (10) is a strictly decreasing function from in￿nity to ®1 ¹ n
¡¾n
t+1 while the
right-hand side is increasing from µ ®2 to in￿nity. Therefore, they should be equal at a single
point comprised in the interval (0; ¹ nt+1). This ends the proof. ¤
We now study the impact of epidemics on the optimal decisions featured in Proposition 1,
i.e. the e￿ects on individual behavior of a drop in the survival probability p and an increase in
the wage.
2.2 Optimal fertility and labor supply under epidemics
A quick look at equation (10) is enough to identify a special case: when the utility term with
respect to consumption is logarithmic, that is when ¾c = 1, wages are no longer a determinant
of optimal fertility and labor supply. In other words, the ￿wage e￿ect￿ is no longer active in
this case. This is by no means a surprise. Higher wages traditionally induce 2 well-identi￿ed,
competing e￿ects: a positive income e￿ect, increasing both consumption and leisure (and thus
decreasing labor supply), and a substitution e￿ect stemming from the increase in the opportunity
cost of leisure, favorable to labor supply. These 2 opposite e￿ects have the same magnitude when
¾c = 1, and thus just o￿set each other in such a parametric case. Since labor supply is then
una￿ected, so is the fertility decision given the optimality condition (5).
In this case, the ￿mortality e￿ect￿ is the only one left, and we are thus able to identify its
speci￿c impact. The next proposition hence provides the optimal response of both labor supply
and fertility to a decreasing survival probability, p.
Proposition 2 Assume ¾c = 1. Then optimal labor supply and fertility are independent of the
wage, wt+1. A decrease in the survival probability p always raises fertility nt+1 and reduces labor
supply, lt+1.
8Proof: The proof is rather simple, even for the second part of the proposition. Indeed, a
change in p does not a￿ect the left hand side of (10), it only a￿ects the right-hand side through



















it follows that a drop in the survival probability p will decrease the right-hand side of equation
(10). Because the left-hand side is una￿ected, and the right-hand side is increasing in nt+1, the
equality (10) is re-established if and only if optimal fertility rises. To get the property relative
to labor supply, we can use a similar argument. First obtain the corresponding single equation





































Then apply the same kind of reasoning as just above on (10). Focusing on equation (12),
one can see that the left-hand side is shifted downwards when p drops. Since the function in the
left-hand side is decreasing in lt+1, this means that lt+1 has to decrease to re-establish equation
(12) for an unchanged right-hand side. In contrast to the fertility analysis above, things are
apparently more complicated because both sides of the equation (12) are indeed altered. A drop
in p also causes the right-hand side to shift upwards, via the term ­
1
¾n
t+2, inducing an additional
downward move in lt+1 since the right-hand side is increasing in this variable. This ends the
proof. ¤
Our results generalize those of Zhang and Zhang (2005) to a certain extent.6 As in the latter
paper, the reduction in survival probability diminishes the need for life-cycle consumption with
respect to fertility, which would straightforwardly imply an increase in fertility and a decrease
in labor supply in the absence of disutility of working and rearing children. In our
model, the disutility of working and rearing children is present, and the properties still hold,
which ultimately shows their robustness. Actually, as one can trivially infer from the proof of
the proposition above, they also hold for any elasticity parameter ¾c.
6see their Proposition 3, page 50.
9Proposition 3 For any ¾c positive, a decrease in the survival probability p always raises fertility
nt+1 and reduces labor supply, lt+1.
Things are apparently much trickier once we allow for the ￿wage e￿ect￿ to be active, i.e. for
¾c 6= 1. The next proposition summarizes the associated properties.
Proposition 4 For any ¾c positive and not equal to 1, an increase in the wage wt+1 raises
labor supply lt+1 and reduces fertility nt+1, if and only ¾c < 1.
Proof: Recall equation (10):
®1 n
¡¾n
t+1 = µ ®2
·












While the left-hand side is una￿ected by wages, the right-hand side is. One can trivially see that
the direction of the shift induced by an increase in wages is entirely determined by the position
of ¾c with respect to 1. If (and only if) ¾c < 1, an increment in wages increases the right-hand
side, which leads to a drop in optimal fertility to re-establish equation (10).
Things are slightly more complicated for labor supply’s optimal response since both sides of





















Suppose the wage wt+1 is rising and ¾c < 1. The left-hand side is shifted upwards, which
induces labor supply to increase to re-establish the equality (since, again, the left-hand side is
decreasing in lt+1). However, the right-hand side is also a￿ected: it is actually shifted downwards,
which again induces a further increase in labor supply since the right-hand side is increasing in
lt+1. We get the opposite picture if ¾c > 1. ¤
The obtained results deserve a careful interpretation. An increase in wages induces a classic
positive income e￿ect, which tends to increase consumption (in both periods), leisure and the
number of children. However, an increase in the number of children and an increase in leisure
are detrimental to each other : henceforth, the positive income e￿ect has a non-trivial impact
on fertility. On the other side, a higher wage increases the opportunity cost both of leisure
and of rearing children. We thus get the typical opposition between income and substitution
10e￿ects ￿ la Kremer and Chen (2002), which has in general an ambiguous e￿ect on fertility.7 A
key departure from Kremer and Chen (2002) is the intertemporal nature of our model. This
characteristic is crucial since it will readily enable us to understand the preeminent role of the
preference parameter ¾c. Indeed, in our story, individuals can take advantage of this wage
increase in t+1 and only in t+1: by increasing their labor supply to take advantage of higher
wages in t + 1, they can transfer consumption to their old age in t + 2. Since the strength of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is measured by 1
¾c, the lower ¾c, the more individuals
will be willing to transfer consumption to t + 2, the more they will work, and the lower leisure
and fertility (via the needed reduction in the time devoted to rearing children). In our simple
model, the ￿threshold￿ value for ¾c is just one, that is logarithmic preferences in consumption
(in both ages): below this threshold, individuals work more and have less children, and above,
we have the opposite picture.
Finally note that the simple result obtained (which itself derives from the simplicity of the
model) does not mean that the other elasticity parameters are unimportant. One can for example
notice that if ¾l, the elasticity of (marginal) utility of leisure with respect to the level of leisure,
is increasingly large, the magnitude of the increase in labor supply will de￿nitely get lower (in
the case ¾c < 1). We will however not comment further, and focus now on the implications of
our theoretical model concerning the HIV/AIDS fertility debate.
2.3 Summary and relation to the AIDS-fertility ambiguity
Our simple model neatly illustrates why an epidemic shock has an ambiguous e￿ect on fertil-
ity. Indeed, if we interpret an epidemic shock as having direct consequences on both survival
probabilities and wages (via the associated large cuts in labor supply), then our model shows
that the total e￿ect on fertility is a priori ambiguous. On one side, a drop in the survival
probability has the same implications for fertility as the well-known insurance e￿ect put forward
by Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), i.e. a rationale for fertility to increase in response to epidemics. On
the other side, under certain conditions, the increase in wages resulting from labor shortage has
the exact opposite e￿ect on fertility, i.e. decreasing it.
Whether the wage e￿ect, neatly identi￿ed in our theory, can actually more than o￿set the
mortality e￿ect on fertility is a crucial question that should deserve the maximal attention. To go
7It should be noted that Kremer and Chen (2002) directly choose a quasi-linear utility function for the
substitution e￿ect to dominate the income e￿ect.
11even further, we do believe that disentangling the wage vs mortality e￿ects on fertility is not only
important to understand and quantitatively assess the economic and demographic impacts of
the current HIV/AIDS crisis, but also to study accurately and meaningfully any other epidemic.
In our empirical work, we shall thus also investigate the malaria case to bring out an additional
insight into this approach. As we will see, this method, by shedding light on some possible
divergences in the impact on individual behavior of two life-threatening diseases, will enable us
to further comment on the two e￿ects at work in an epidemic shock (i.e. the ￿wage e￿ect￿ and
the ￿mortality e￿ect￿).
Last but not least, it is of utmost importance to note that one can perfectly extend the
analysis conducted on fertility (and labor supply) to education. As already stated, if the typ-
ical trade-o￿ quality vs quantity of children were introduced in the model, the wage e￿ect of
epidemics would have implied an increasing quality of children (that is, more education) as the
number of children goes down. Hence, the increase in the opportunity cost of rearing children,
directly induced by the rise in wages, should increase educational attainment along with decreas-
ing the fertility rate. The mortality e￿ect yields the opposite outcomes. Again, the total e￿ect
on education depends on the strength of the wage e￿ect relative to the mortality e￿ect. Our
empirical section hence also investigates this crucial aspect of the ongoing debate on HIV/AIDS.
Hence, our empirical section will now be devoted to studying the impact of both malaria and
HIV prevalence on the individual behavioral patterns that are fertility and education.
3 Empirical testing
3.1 Impacts of HIV and malaria on life expectancy, education and
fertility
We ￿rst present the tested equations, variables of interest, control variables and speci￿cations.
We then check the robustness of our results before commenting them extensively.
3.1.1 Empirical model and data
In order to check for the behavioral e￿ects of HIV and malaria prevalence, we estimate three
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i is the error term.
Fertility rate
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i is the error term.
®s, ¯s and °s only measure the direct e￿ects of HIV prevalence, malaria prevalence, life
expectancy and education, without taking into account interdependencies. For instance, the
impact of HIV prevalence on life expectancy may be lower than ®1 if the spread of the HIV
epidemic contributes to raising average educational attainment. After substituting equation (1)
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Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a new-born infant would live if pre-
vailing patterns of mortality at the time of his birth were to stay the same throughout his life.
Fertility rate is the number of children that a woman would have if she lived through all of her
child-bearing years and experienced the current age-speci￿c fertility rates at each age. Data on
life expectancy and fertility come from the United Nations Population Division (2007). Edu-
cation is measured by average schooling years in population aged 25 or over. Data come from
Baier et al. (2006).8 Since it is not available for consecutive years, missing values have been ￿lled
by linear interpolation. Data on HIV prevalence in adult population, the percentage of people
aged 15-49 who are infected with HIV, have been con￿dentially obtained from UNAIDS. Though
estimations of HIV prevalence in the adult population are mostly based on HIV prevalence in
pregnant women, which may not be a representative sample, Walker et al. (2003) show that both
prevalence rates are fairly close and Young (2005b) does not ￿nd that using antenatal infection
rates instead of community infection rates causes a bias. Finally, malaria prevalence has been
calculated by Gallup and Sachs (2001) using a 1994 World Health Organization map of the
geographical extent of high malaria risk and detailed data on the world population distribution.
It represents the fraction of the population living in high malaria prevalence areas in 1994.
Control variables
In terms of control variables, life expectancy is expected to depend on education, real income
per capita, prevalence of undernourishment, political competition and con￿ict occurrence.
Well-educated individuals are more likely to adopt the behaviors that improve their health
or the well-being of those under their responsibility, i.e. babies and children (Grossman, 2004;
Cutler et al., 2006).
A high income supports the public and private per capita expenditures on goods and services
which contribute to better health: public health services, private health care, medicines and
shelter (Pritchett and Summers, 1996; Fuchs, 2004). Real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$
from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006) is used since the purchasing power of US$1
8This dataset has been chosen in place of the most commonly used Barro-Lee (Barro and Lee, 2000) and
Cohen-Soto (Cohen and Soto, 2007) datasets because it provides the highest spatio-temporal coverage. However
it will be seen in the next section that results are robust to changes in the education variable.
14widely di￿ers across countries.
An adequate supply of calories should make an individual less vulnerable to sickness and,
in the case of childbearers, it should foster a normal foetal development, which reduces the in-
cidence of factors a￿ecting mortality in adulthood (Fogel, 1994; Cutler et al., 2006). However,
an excessive supply of calories may put health at risk (Hamoudi and Sachs, 1999a; U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 2005). Hence, both the number of calories per day and the
number of calories per day squared are introduced in order to take into account this quadratic
relationship. Data come from the FAO Statistics Division9 and since it is also not available for
consecutive years, missing values have been ￿lled by linear interpolation.
In democracies, voters and opposition parties who are unsatis￿ed with the policies of the
current leader can withdraw their political support; at elections voters can replace him with a
more attractive political opponent and during the political term, opposition parties can approve
only consensual policies. Confronted to high political competition, a politic leader must thus
satisfy a large fraction of the electorate to remain in power, which should favor spending on
non-exclusive and universally demanded public goods, such as health or education (Pinto and
Timmons, 2005; Stasavage, 2005). Political competition is measured by the Vanhanen compe-
tition index (Vanhanen, 2000).10It is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by
the largest party from 10011 and ranges from 0, in the case of a non-elected government, to a
cutting point of 70%.
An intra-territory war can reduce life expectancy by directly causing death or by destroying
public infrastructures and economic activity (Collier et al., 2003). The armed con￿icts dataset
developed by Uppsala University (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004) provides a measure of the
intensity and length of a territorial con￿ict. The con￿ict occurrence variable takes the value of
1 if a minor armed con￿ict occurs, i.e. at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than
1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the con￿ict, 2 if an intermediate armed con￿ict
9http://www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/
10Other measures of political competition exist but they tend to be cruder. For instance the ￿PARCOMP￿
variable of the Polity dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) varies between 1 (oppositional activity is repressed)
and 5 (competitive political participation). Both variables are nevertheless highly correlated, with a correlation
coe￿cient of 0.80. Correlations with the combined Polity score or the Freedom House Political Rights indicator
(Freedom House, 2005) are even higher: 0.85 and 0.82, respectively.
11In parliamentary elections ￿the largest party￿ refers to the party which received the largest single share of the
votes or of the seats in parliament, and in presidential elections ￿the largest party￿ refers to the votes received
by the presidential candidate who won the election. The index tries to correct for di￿erences in electoral systems
and political regimes, by taking into account the dominant governmental institutions (executive, legislature or
both) and the electoral system (majority or proportional).
15occurs, i.e. at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and at least 1000 battle-related deaths
during the course of the con￿ict and 3 if a war occurs, i.e at least 1000 battle-related deaths per
year. For ease of interpretation the variable has been re-scaled from range 0 to 1.
Besides HIV prevalence, malaria prevalence and life expectancy, probable determinants of
education are real income per capita, economic rights of women, political competition and con-
￿ict occurrence. Access to public or private provision of education is likely to increase with
real income per capita and expected economic growth, by raising the private return to investing
in schooling, may induce greater schooling (Bils and Klenow, 2000). Even if theoretically they
have access to education, women are unlikely to acquire new skills if they do not have any eco-
nomic rights e.g. if they cannot work/choose freely their occupation without the consent of their
husband or a male’s relative and if they are otherwise highly discriminated in the workplace.
The Cingranelli and Richards (2007) Women Economic Rights indicator provides a measure of
gender inequality in access to work, varying between 0 and 3 (from none to strong). For ease
of interpretation the variable has been rescaled from range 0 to 1. For reasons previously given,
political competition may increase public provision of education whereas con￿ict occurrence can
hinder access to education.
In addition to HIV prevalence, life expectancy and education, fertility should be in￿uenced
by real income per capita and con￿ict occurrence. The net costs of childrearing, e.g. housing,
nursing and training costs, tend to be higher in more developed countries (Becker, 1992) and
con￿ict occurrence is likely to decrease the willingness or the feasibility of having children since
current and future upbringing conditions may not be (seen as) optimal (Agadjanian and Prata,
2001).
Speci￿cations
Time and country e￿ects are also included. Time dummies control for unobserved time-
speci￿c factors common to all countries. Country-speci￿c e￿ects capture factors which do not
vary much over the period observed and which may have been omitted. Following standard
practices and previous papers, most variables appear in their original form.12 Box-Cox tests
12Variables measured in years, variables which are shares or percent and indexes tend to be untransformed
as it facilitates interpretation of results. Variables strongly dominated by zero values, like HIV prevalence rate,
should not be transformed. Variables which are large positive integer values usually appear in logarithms.
16validate the choice of these speci￿cations, especially for the fertility speci￿cation, and it facilitates
interpretation of the results. However, not taking logs can increase the sensitivity of estimates
to in￿uential observations, especially when variables heavily skewed like HIV prevalence are
included. Hence, thanks to a Cook’s D test, in￿uential outliers have been removed from the
sample. The ￿nal sample is composed of 69 developing countries over the 1980-2004 period, with
one observation per country, when available, every ￿ve year period.13 The choice of quinquennia
has been mainly driven by the fact that the U.N. population division only provides ￿ve year
averages of some key variables such as life expectancy and fertility rate. Furthermore, the yearly
variation of interpolated variables, like education or caloric intake, is relatively meaningless and
taking averages may reduce the e￿ect of short-run ￿uctuations. Summary statistics are given in
table 1.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Life expectancy 59.23 9.84 39.2 78.10
Education 4.64 2.39 0.4 10.27
Fertility rate 4.79 1.72 1.24 8.5
HIV prevalence (%) 1.61 3.42 0 23.76
Malaria prevalence 0.6 0.43 0 1
Ln(Real GDP per capita) 7.81 0.92 5.68 9.74
Ln (Calories per day) 7.76 0.14 7.41 8.12
Political Competition 28.48 20.45 0 70
Con￿ict occurrence 0.17 0.31 0 1
Women economic rights 0.37 0.15 0 0.87
Observations: 319
Table 1: Summary statistics
Equations 2 to 3 explicitly account for circular causality between life expectancy and edu-
cation, and all dependent variables may be endogenous to other explanatory variables. A likely
candidate is income per capita. Income per capita tends to rise when the health and the edu-
cation of the population improves and population growth slows down (Ahituv, 2001; Cohen and
Soto, 2004; Bloom et al., 2004). The HIV prevalence rate may also be endogenous. For instance,
educated people may know better the risks associated with unprotected sex (Kim, 2006), leading
the coe￿cient of HIV prevalence to be negatively biased. To correct this simultaneity bias in the
context of panel data models, when no obvious external instruments are available, internal in-
struments based on the lags of the instrumented variables can be used. This can be done through
13The ￿ve year periods are 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1994-1999 and 2000-2004.
17the application of the generalized methods of moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blun-
dell and Bond, 1998). In a nutshell, each equation is simultaneously estimated in ￿rst di￿erence
and level by using a system estimation.14 To ensure consistent estimates of the coe￿cients, the
equation in ￿rst-di￿erence (level) is instrumented by the lagged levels (￿rst-di￿erences) of the
endogenous variables. In order not to over￿t the instrumented variables, which may bias the
results towards those of feasible generalized least squares, the GMM instruments are restricted
to period t¡2 (t¡1)lagged levels (￿rst-di￿erences) of each variable for the ￿rst-di￿erence (level)
equation.15 Under the assumptions that these lagged values of the variables are not correlated
with the error term and that the error term is not serially correlated, they should be appropriate
instruments. The validity of the instruments will be tested through Hansen (1982) J tests of
overidentifying restrictions and an Arellano and Bond (1991) test of serial correlation of the
di￿erenced error term.
All variables are instrumented in that way, besides malaria prevalence. Since this measure
is time-invariant, external instruments are used. Quick reproduction of the malaria parasite
and its vector, the Anopheles mosquito, requires a hot and humid stable climate (Bloom and
Sachs, 1998). A series of ￿rst-stage regressions using K￿ppen Climate Classi￿cation data from
CIESIN (2002) show indeed that malaria prevalence is higher in countries with a large percentage
of land classi￿ed in tropical zones whereas the opposite tends to be true in countries with a
large percentage of land classi￿ed in temperate zones.16 In addition, Kiszewski et al. (2004)
have developed an index of malaria ecology, highly signi￿cant in ￿rst-stage regressions, which
combines in a single measure temperature, mosquito abundance, and vector speci￿city. Overall
when both climatic measures and the more elaborate index of malaria ecology are included, ￿rst-




In that case, simultaneously estimating them could provide more e￿cient estimates as correlation in the errors
across equations are taken into account. A common system estimation method is three stage least squares.
However, in order to deal with both the country-speci￿c e￿ects and the absence of obvious and time-varying
instruments, only equations in di￿erences, in which variables of interest are instrumented with their lagged
level values, could be exploited, which may generate biased and ine￿cient estimates if past levels provide little
information about future changes. Though ￿GMM-style￿ instruments could be constructed, using lagged values
would reduce sample size, and by extension, e￿ciency. Control explanatory variables which are endogenous
would have to be instrumented too, which increases the risk of inconsistency of the estimates if one equation
is misspeci￿ed. Finally, using di￿erences would preclude the inclusion of the time-invariant malaria measure.
Hence, estimating each equation separately appears in ￿ne a more robust and adequate estimation procedure.
15Roodman (2004) indicates that a rule of thumb is that the number of instruments should not exceed the num-
ber of countries in the regression. Note that instrumenting with lagged values requires at least three observations
by country. Hence, countries not meeting this threshold have been dropped from the ￿nal sample.
16More speci￿cally, only the following climatic zones were found signi￿cant: climatic zone of tropical, tropical
monsoonal; climatic zone of tropical, tropical wet; climatic zone of temperate, marine west coast-mild with no dry
season, warm summer; climatic zone of temperate, Mediterranean-mild with dry, hot summer. For each broad
climatic zone, the two sub-climatic zones are combined into a single variable by adding them.
18stage F tests and partial R2 indicate that these instruments can be regarded as ￿strong￿ since
they respectively equal 47, well above the Stock et al. (2002)’s rule of thumb of 10, and 0.30.
In comparison to GMM instruments, these three variables are treated as exogenous standard
instruments, with one column in the instrument matrix per variable since they are not lagged.
3.1.2 Results
Results are presented in table 2. In all regressions, the validity of the instruments cannot be
rejected. In terms of control variables, most of them are signi￿cant and have the expected sign.
Income per capita increases life expectancy and reduces fertility. However no signi￿cant impact is
found on education, suggesting that high education of the population can be attained at di￿erent
income levels. Though the supply of calories is not signi￿cant, the turning point beyond which
the number of calories starts having a negative impact on health is coherent: 2400 calories per
day, which is in the range of the number of calories required by active individuals to sustain their
weight (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2005). Political participation in￿uences
positively and signi￿cantly life expectancy but not education; in countries with the highest rate
of political participation (70%), citizens tend to live 5 years more. Reduction of gender inequality
in access to work could signi￿cantly enhance education since full women economic rights translate
into an increase of 2.75 years in average years of schooling. Finally, occurrence of a con￿ict only
seems to a￿ect fertility: a war decreases fertility by 0.60 child. The number of casualties and
the spatial coverage of most con￿icts may not be high enough to in￿uence life expectancy and
education but may su￿ciently disrupt the lives of many couples and darken the future.17
Turning to the variables of interest, though HIV prevalence and malaria prevalence are both
found to decrease life expectancy (column 1), they exert diverging e￿ects on education (column
2) and fertility (column 3): whereas HIV prevalence increases education and decreases fertility,
malaria prevalence in￿uences negatively education and does not seem to a￿ect fertility. Educa-
tion and life expectancy are signi￿cant in all columns and have the expected sign: both in￿uence
positively each other and lower fertility. As a consequence, for both infectious diseases, total
e￿ects on life expectancy, education and fertility di￿er from direct e￿ects: lower in the case of
HIV, higher in the case of malaria.
17Other variables, included in Hamoudi and Sachs (1999a) and Conley et al. (2006) have been tested: population
density, urbanisation rate, area weighted Green Revolution modern variety crops. None was found to be signi￿cant
in equations 2, 1 or 3.
19Life expectancy Education Fertility
(1) (2) (3)
HIV Prevalence -0.83a 0.10b -0.07b
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Malaria prevalence -3.11c -2.05a 0.38
(1.80) (0.47) (0.32)
Life expectancy 0.08b -0.07a
(0.04) (0.02)
Years of Schooling 1.70a -0.12b
(0.55) (0.05)
Ln (GDP per capita) 3.12a 0.58 -0.63a
(1.16) (0.43) (0.20)
Ln (Calories per day) 322.23
(279.73)
Ln (Calories per day)2 -20.70
(18.27)
Political competition 0.07a 0.00
(0.03) (0.01)
Women economic rights 2.75a
(0.99)
Con￿ict occurrence 0.15 0.29 -0.60a
(1.57) (0.59) (0.24)
Constant -1226.05 -5.35c 14.76a
(1073.59) (3.23) (1.37)
Observations 319 319 319
Countries 69 69 69
Instruments 50 44 38
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) 0.00 0.23 0.00
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 0.30 0.88 0.58
Hansen overidenti￿cation test 0.25 0.80 0.85
Di￿erence-in-Sargan test GMM 0.71 0.48 0.72
Di￿erence-in-Sargan test IV 0.48 0.20 0.94
Total signi￿cant HIV impact -0.76 0.04 -0.02
Total signi￿cant malaria impact -7.63 -2.66 0.85
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All GMM standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust and include the Windmeijer (2000) ￿nite-sample correction.
Unreported time dummies are included.
Table 2: The multifaceted impacts of HIV and malaria
20Average years of Schooling
Total signi￿cant impact
Baier et al. Over 25 Cohen-Soto Over 15 Cohen-Soto Over 25 Cohen-Soto Not studying 16-64
HIV 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.19
Malaria -0.42 -0.92 -1.08 -1.13
Countries 259 259 259 259
Observations 55 55 55 55
Gross enrollment rates
Total signi￿cant impact
Baier et al. Over 25 Primary enrollment Secondary enrollment Tertiary enrollment
HIV 0.16 1.24 -0.06 -0.33
Malaria N.S. -10.83 -6.03 -3.10
Countries 283 283 283 283
Observations 65 65 65 65
Notes: N.S.: not signi￿cant.
Table 3: Alternative schooling indicators
Before going any further in our interpretation of the results, ￿nding a positive impact of HIV
prevalence on education is novel enough to justify robustness checks by using alternative schooling
data. In addition, the impact of HIV on education could be underestimated as it may occur with
delay and average years of schooling concern only the over 25 years old population, i.e. people
already at the end of their primary school when the HIV epidemic became rampant. In table
3, using the Cohen and Soto (2007) high quality educational attainment dataset, speci￿cations
(1) and (2) have been rerun with average years of schooling in three di￿erent fractions of the
population: over 15, over 25, population 15-64 who is not studying. In a second stage, the
impact of HIV prevalence on primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment rates has also
been investigated since ￿ows of schooling may better capture the short-term impact of HIV
than stocks of human capital. Data on school enrollment come from the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2007).18 Outliers have been removed from the ￿nal samples, and for
comparison, results with the Baier et al. (2006) variable are also provided.
18Due to the adoption by UNESCO of a new International Standard Classi￿cation of Education (ISCED97),
post 2000 data are not directly comparable with old standard data (1970-2000). In order to take into account
this change, series of school enrollment rates have been adjusted by regressing old standard data on available new
standard data and replacing missing values for the period 2001-2004 by predicted values.
21New estimations with the Cohen-Soto dataset are very comparable to those in table 2; co-
e￿cients of life expectancy, education and HIV prevalence are highly signi￿cant, whichever the
schooling variable used. As expected, a slightly stronger impact of HIV prevalence is found
when looking at the population aged over 15. In terms of magnitude, table 3 shows that the
impact of HIV prevalence is more than twice larger than the one found with the Baier et al.
dataset, keeping the sample constant. However, when the Baier et al. variable is not used,
malaria prevalence never appears to in￿uence directly education, which explains why its total
impact on schooling is lower than what has been previously found. Estimations using school
enrollment rates provide a more contrasted view. Coe￿cients of life expectancy, education and
HIV prevalence are in most cases signi￿cant whereas no direct impact of malaria is again found.
HIV prevalence appears to exert its strongest positive e￿ect on primary school enrollment, which
usually takes place between the ages of 5 and 13. Though HIV prevalence exerts a direct positive
and signi￿cant impact on secondary school enrollment (between 14 and 17), the total e￿ect is
small and negative. Finally the direct impact of HIV prevalence on tertiary school enrollment
(between 18 and 24) is positive but non-signi￿cant, resulting in a negative total e￿ect. This
pattern can be interpreted as proof that a full positive e￿ect of HIV prevalence on education has
only recently occurred, explaining why the impact becomes increasingly negative with the age
of schooling. Alternatively, parents may invest more in the primary education of their children
but the latter need to drop out of school to take care of their HIV-infected relatives or because
they have become themselves infected (Shae￿er, 1994). In any case, this varying impact of HIV
prevalence on di￿erent school enrollment rates is consistent with an overall positive impact of
HIV prevalence on average years of schooling as long as the positive e￿ect on primary school
enrollment is overwhelming, as it seems to be the case. Overall, these robustness checks indicate
that the positive relationship between HIV prevalence and education is robust to changes in
dependent variable and sample.19
The results of table 2 and table 3 can nevertheless trigger two additional concerns. Since
HIV prevalence and malaria prevalence are extremely high in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative
to other developing regions, both may proxy for omitted structural factors speci￿c to SSA. In
19Young (2005a) emphasizes that HIV-induced orphanhood can have a detrimental impact on general educa-
tional attainment. In unreported regressions, it is found that the share of orphans in the population of children
does not exert a signi￿cant negative impact on schooling indicators any more if life expectancy is included among
determinants, implying that the latter adequately captures the detrimental e￿ect of orphanhood (data on the
number of orphans over the 1990-2005 period come from UNAIDS (2002)).
22addition, SSA countries represent about 50% of the sample: their inclusion may ￿dominate￿ the
coe￿cient estimates. In other words, the coe￿cient of HIV and malaria may be di￿erent for non-
SSA countries. These worries are investigated in table 4 by ￿rst including a SSA dummy among
other determinants and by afterwards interacting HIV prevalence and malaria prevalence with a
non-SSA dummy.20 It appears that the SSA dummy is only signi￿cant when estimating the life
expectancy speci￿cation (column 5); its coe￿cient implies that life expectancy is structurally
three and a half years lower in SSA than in other developing regions. The fact that its inclusion
slightly a￿ects the magnitude and signi￿cance of other determinants suggests that some variables
had previously picked up an omitted SSA e￿ect, such as the e￿ect of other infectious diseases.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of slope di￿erences between SSA and non-SSA countries can
be strictly rejected since all interaction terms are not signi￿cant.
Taking into account the lower estimated impact of malaria prevalence and HIV prevalence
on life expectancy induced by the inclusion of the SSA variable, these new estimates suggest
that an additional 1% point in HIV prevalence reduces life expectancy by 0.68 years, increases
average years of schooling by 0.06 and reduces fertility by 0.04 child or -0.83% at a sample mean.
Likewise, in a country fully exposed to malaria, life expectancy, average years of schooling and
fertility are respectively 5.74 years, 2.47 years lower and 0.62 child higher than in a malaria free
country. These e￿ects remain in the range of what studies have previously found. Overall, for
a country like Zambia, with a HIV prevalence rate of about 17% in 2004, these results imply a
loss of 12 years in life expectancy, a 1 year gain in average years of schooling and a fertility rate
reduced by 0.70 child. Conversely, total eradication of malaria in this country, i.e. going from
100% to 0% of population at risk, would increase life expectancy and education by 5.74 and 2.47
years respectively while fertility would decrease by 0.62 child.
It is worth noting that these estimations are in line with the medical and economic literature.
The estimations of the United Nations Population Division (2006) for life expectancy ￿with AIDS￿
and ￿without AIDS￿ suggest that a 1% rise in HIV prevalence is associated with a drop of 0.90
year in life expectancy. Concerning fertility, based on various studies and Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) conducted in Africa, Lewis et al. (2004) and Young (2005b) ￿nd that a
20Interacting both variables with the SSA dummy yields the same results but highly increases multicollinearity
between variables of interest (HIV prevalence, malaria prevalence, SSA dummy) and their interaction. In the
case of HIV, the interaction term is instrumented by its lagged values. In the malaria case, the interaction term
is instrumented by the external instruments interacted with the non-SSA dummy.
231% rise in HIV prevalence decreases fertility by about 0.37% and 1.20%, respectively.21 With
respect to education, Young (2005a) postulates that a positive relationship should exist between
education and HIV prevalence, but ￿nds in another paper an inconsistent in￿uence of the HIV
prevalence rate on measures of educational enrolment or achievement in Africa: depending both
on the education variable and on control variables, sign and signi￿cance vary. Finally, only the
results of Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) are in total contradiction with our study, since she concludes
that AIDS incidence in Africa directly increases fertility and decreases school enrollment rates.
Her ￿ndings suggest that the relationship between HIV prevalence rates and schooling or fertility
may be sensitive to changes in sample or dependent variables.22
Concerning malaria, results re￿ect the literature. Using longitudinal demographic surveil-
lance data from Ghana, Bawah and Binka (2003) calculates that life expectancy would increase
by 6 years if malaria was eradicated. Several microeconomic studies have shown that beyond
the e￿ect of reduced longevity, infection by malaria causes neuro-cognitive impairment, both in
the short- and long- term, and increases school absenteeism (Chima et al., 2003; Kihara et al.,
2006). Finally Conley et al. (2006) ￿nd that the fertility rate is 0.90 child higher in a country
fully exposed to malaria.
To put our results in a nutshell, a higher malaria prevalence lowers both life expectancy and
education. The fact that no direct impact of malaria on fertility is found further suggests that
life expectancy and education adequately capture the overall e￿ects of this infectious disease.23
On the other hand, a higher HIV prevalence rate is found to lower life expectancy and fertility,
but to increase educational attainment.
21The fact that the elasticities of fertility to HIV found by Young (2005b) largely exceed the decline in total
fertility attributable to the lower biological fertility of HIV-infected women, as calculated by Lewis et al. (2004),
suggest that uninfected people, or people believing not to be infected, modify their fertility-related behaviors. In
another paper, Young (2005b) then uses microdata of 57 DHS in 27 SSA countries and ￿nds, after controlling
for country-speci￿c e￿ects, time-speci￿c e￿ects and confounding factors that HIV prevalence leads to increased
use of all forms of contraception, suggesting that these behavioral changes may not only re￿ect a willingness to
reduce unprotected sexual activity but also to purposely control fertility.
22Using similar econometric techniques (weighted least squares with country ￿xed e￿ects and and time e￿ects),
variables (infant mortality, primary and secondary school enrollment rates, AIDS incidence) and sample (only
SSA countries over the 1985-2000 period), it is found in unreported regressions that AIDS incidence has a direct
(non-) signi￿cant positive impact on (primary) secondary school enrollment rate and a highly signi￿cant direct
negative impact on the fertility rate. In addition it is unclear how AIDS cases, which occur about 5-10 years after
HIV infections (Walker et al., 2003), are an useful proxy of the contemporaneous spread of the HIV epidemic.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25We can further notice that this direct e￿ect of HIV on fertility exceeds what we can at-
tribute to physiological reasons,24 suggesting a modi￿cation of the fertility-related behavior of
uninfected people. Indeed, similarly to Young (2005a), our elasticity of fertility reaction to HIV
largely exceeds the one directly imputable to a lower biological fertility of HIV-infected women
as calculated by Lewis et al. (2004).
Interpretation of the behavioral impacts of HIV found by our empirical study now enable
us to bring a straightforward answer to the HIV/AIDS ￿fertility ambiguity￿ exempli￿ed in our
simple theoretical model, and comparing its e￿ects those of malaria brings further insight in the
two opposite forces at work. By lowering life expectancy, both infectious diseases exert a similar
￿mortality e￿ect￿, i.e. increasing demand for children. Hence, if this were the unique direct e￿ect
of epidemics like HIV/AIDS or malaria on individual behaviors, they would systematically be
found to increase the fertility rate, and through the previously evoked ￿quantity-quality￿ trade-
o￿, diminish educational attainment. However, the two diseases are found to exert an opposite
in￿uence on education: higher malaria prevalence indeed lowers the educational attainment,
whereas HIV has a positive impact on education and a negative in￿uence on fertility. This
suggests the existence of a second force, that could be either counterbalancing or reinforcing
the ￿mortality e￿ect￿ on the individual behaviors, depending on its direction. In the case of the
HIV/AIDS epidemics, we can go further and state that this competing channel not only o￿sets,
but even dominates the e￿ects of the diminishing survival probability.
In our theoretical model, the force leading to a lower demand for children is a rise in the
wages, induced by the labor shortage and resulting in an increase in the foregone value of time
spent rearing children. In the case of the HIV/AIDS epidemics, this conjecture seems consistent
with the behavioral nature of the HIV impact on fertility we exempli￿ed, meaning that the drop
is not only caused by physiological consequences of the infection, but indeed re￿ects a will to
purposefully control fertility. In the case of malaria, however, one has to be more careful. First,
the fact that under certain speci￿cations we don’t ￿nd any direct impact of this infectious disease
on fertility and education casts doubts on the existence of a signi￿cant second force beyond the
￿mortality e￿ect￿. Then, even in the cases where a direct e￿ect is indeed found on education,
24As far as the biological changes are concerned, the fertility of HIV-positive women has been found to be
about 30% lower than HIV-negative women in SSA, causing a population-attributable decline in total fertility
of 0.37% for every percentage point of HIV prevalence (Lewis et al., 2004). This negative impact on fertility is
usually explained by lower coital frequency due to ill health and epidemiological synergies between HIV and other
sexually-transmitted infections, which reduce the ability to conceive and increase the risk of foetal loss (Gray et
al., 1998).
26one could always invoke the neuro-cognitive impairment induced by the disease, leaving few or
no room to any behavioral channel behind the impact of malaria on educational attainment.
Hence, in order to ascertain our conjectures, we need now to control for the impact of HIV
and malaria prevalence on the evolution of wages. The next section presents our results and
concludes the interpretation.
3.2 HIV, malaria and wages
Following closely Rodrik (1999), the following speci￿cation will be estimated:
Ln (Wages)
t
i = Á0 + Á1 HIV prevalence
t





i + Á5Ln(Consumption price level)
t
i +






i is the error term. Wages should be strongly related to labor productivity. In
addition, GDP per capita controls for structural determinants associated with income, the price
level of consumption takes into account cost of living di￿erences and according to Rodrik (1999),
stronger political participation may raise wages by conferring more bargaining power to workers.
HIV prevalence (Á1) should exert a direct positive in￿uence on wages, by reducing the supply of
labor.25 The impact of malaria (Á2) is however ambiguous as it depends on the overall e￿ect of
this infectious disease on the growth of the workforce, i.e. whether the mortality e￿ect outweighs
the fertility e￿ect. In addition, its short-run impact may have dissipated since malaria prevalence
is relatively stable since the end of the sixties, particularly in SSA (Hamoudi and Sachs, 1999b).
On the other hand, the HIV epidemic has only started its spread since the beginning of the
eighties and mostly kills economically active adults, whereas malaria mostly kills children.26
Hence, over the period investigated (1980-2004), inter- and intra-country variations in HIV
prevalence are most likely to a￿ect the growth of labor force supply than di￿erences in the level
of malaria prevalence between countries.
25Indirect e￿ects of HIV and malaria, e.g. impacts on health and schooling, should be captured by the labor
productivity variable.
26In the world, 90% of the victims of malaria are less than 4 years-old. On the other hand, 81% of the victims
of HIV are between 15 and 60 years-old. See http://www.who.int/healthinfo/bodestimates/en/index.html
27Wages and productivity are respectively measured by average manufacturing wage per worker27
and average manufacturing value added per worker. Current US$ values are converted into con-
stant 2000 US$, by multiplying wages and productivity per worker by the ratio of constant GDP
to current GDP, both values coming from the World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2007). Data on wages and productivity can be found in UNIDO (1997) and on UNIDO’s web-
site for the years beyond 1995.28 Since data are not available for consecutive years, missing
values have been ￿lled by linear interpolation. Price level of consumption is the price level of a
country’s consumption basket in internationally comparable, purchasing-power-adjusted terms.
Data come from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006). Other determinants have been
previously described.
According to a Cook’s D test, in￿uential outliers have been removed. In terms of econometric
methodology, equation 4 has been ￿rst estimated by applying the system GMM. However, re-
gressors may not be endogenous and if explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, the system
GMM estimators remain consistent but less e￿cient than a random e￿ects panel estimator, for
which no simultaneity and no correlation between explanatory variables and the country-speci￿c
e￿ect are assumed. At the bottom of table 5, results of a Hausman speci￿cation test between
the system GMM and random e￿ects models suggest that taking into account SSA speci￿city is
crucial as other determinants partially proxy for it, leading to an omitted variable bias. As long
as a SSA dummy is included, the exogeneity of the regressors cannot be rejected. Hence, results
obtained with the random e￿ects panel estimator are given.29 The sample includes 65 countries
over the 1980-2004 period, with one observation, when available, by country every ￿ve years.
Results can be seen in table 5. Once a SSA dummy is included (column (14)), in line with
the ￿ndings of Rodrik (1999), labor productivity is a strong determinant of wages. Price level of
consumption may be picking up the e￿ect of bargaining as workers are more interested in real
consumption wages than in real product wages. The signi￿cant impact of income per capita may
27It is important to note that wages supposedly do not include employers contributions in respect of their
employees paid to social security, pension and insurance schemes, as well as the bene￿ts received by employees
under these schemes and severance and termination pay. Hence, their variations should not re￿ect the impact of
HIV on the health care costs and death bene￿ts paid by employers, which can be fairly high. For instance, USAID
(2001) reports that death bene￿ts can equate as much as three years of salary, without including funeral-related
expenses.
28http://www.unido.org/doc/3474. For some countries, 1995 values are available on the website. They are
correlated at 0.97 with the UNIDO (1997) values.
29In line with this argumentation, GMM and ￿xed e￿ects estimates are very close to the random e￿ects estimates
and the Hausman speci￿cation test between ￿xed e￿ects and random e￿ects tend not to reject the exogeneity of
explanatory variables. Obviously, relying on within variations when using a ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation precludes
the estimation of the impact of malaria as proxy variables are time-invariant.
28Ln (Wages per worker)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
HIV Prevalence 0.016a 0.013b 0.013b 0.013b 0.015b 0.013b
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Malaria prevalence 0.021 -0.125 -0.117 0.027 -0.170
(0.125) (0.107) (0.106) (0.124) (0.124)
1982 Malarious area -0.200b
(0.102)
1982-1994 ¢ Malarious area 0.215
(0.140)
SSA dummy 0.334a 0.330a 0.188c 0.374a 0.315a
(0.080) (0.081) (0.107) (0.092) (0.076)
HIV * No SSA dummy -0.026
(0.066)
Malaria* No SSA dummy -0.223
(0.169)
Ln (Value added per worker) 0.747a 0.741a 0.735a 0.732a 0.726a 0.745a
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046)
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.202a 0.238a 0.248a 0.249a 0.253a 0.232a
(0.056) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.047)
Ln (Price level) 0.101b 0.103b 0.108b 0.099b 0.120a 0.104b
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Political competition 0.002 0.002c 0.002c 0.002c 0.002 0.002c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.891c -1.192b -1.221b -1.150b -1.222b -1.088b
(0.514) (0.506) (0.495) (0.499) (0.536) (0.499)
Observation 248 248 248 248 213 248
Countries 65 65 65 65 54 65
R2 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90
Hausman test GMM vs RE 0.00 0.74 0.09 0.53 0.85 0.91
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors are in
parentheses. All standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust. Unreported time
dummies are included.
Table 5: Wages and infectious diseases: random-e￿ects estimation
29mean that the factor share of labor in manufacturing increases with the level of development
or that GDP per capita captures changes in productivity not picked up by labor productivity.
Finally, workers seem more likely to in￿uence wages in a democratic political regime. The
signi￿cant and positive coe￿cient of the SSA dummy suggests that some factors speci￿c to this
region raise wages above what can be expected in other developing regions. The data are not
detailed enough to explore this issue further but this SSA premium would be consistent with a
shortage of skilled manufacturing workers in SSA.
HIV prevalence exerts a signi￿cant and positive direct impact on wages; a 1% point rise
in HIV prevalence would increase wages by about 1.3%, assuming, like Young does, that HIV-
infected workers remain super￿cially healthy, i.e. their productivity does not decrease until their
immune system totally breaks down. On the other hand, malaria prevalence exerts a negative
impact on wages but its coe￿cient is not signi￿cant. Checking di￿erences in slopes between
SSA and other developing regions (columns 15 and 16) or limiting the sample to countries which
belonged to the panel data of section 3 (column 17) does not a￿ect these initial results. Taking
these results at face value, wages in South Africa, thanks to a HIV prevalence rate of 19% in
2004, are 25% higher than they would have been in the absence of the HIV epidemic.
However, speci￿cation 4 does not take into account the short-run dynamics of malaria.
Though the last revised data on population at risk of malaria is only available for the year
1994, a Harvard’s Center for International Development (CID) dataset provides estimates of the
percentage of a country’s area infected with malaria in 1982 and 1994.30 The 1982 value and the
change in the percentage of malarious area over the 1982-1994 period are both included in col-
umn (18). Such speci￿cation, proposed by Gallup and Sachs (2001), can be roughly considered
as a test of equality between the long-term impact and the short-term impact of higher malaria
prevalence. It is found that an increase in malaria prevalence has a positive but not signi￿cant
impact on wages whereas initial level of malaria exerts a strong negative e￿ect on future wages
as full prevalence of malaria reduces wages by about 20%. This ￿nding can be interpreted as
showing that an increase in malaria prevalence slightly decreases labor force supply, causing an
insigni￿cant increase in wages. However, the negative and signi￿cant impact of initial malaria
prevalence may be explained by a lower labor demand if chronic malaria prevalence hinders
economic activity.31
30http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/CID/ciddata/geographydata.htm
31Gallup and Sachs (2001) found that a country fully exposed to malaria in 1965, grew -1.3% less quickly than
30Overall these results tend to support our conjectures. The opposite impact of HIV and
malaria prevalence on education and fertility, even though those two diseases have a similar
impact on life expectancy, is found to be accompanied by an opposite impact on wages. In
the case of malaria, higher malaria prevalence in the short term does not su￿ciently a￿ect
the labor supply to trigger a rise in wages. This is not surprising since malaria mostly kills
children. However, in the long term, chronic malaria prevalence reduces both economic activity
and labor demand, causing a drop in wages. The ￿mortality e￿ect￿ and the ￿wage e￿ect￿ go in
the same direction, leading to a rise in fertility and a drop in educational attainment. In the
case of HIV however, a higher HIV prevalence lowers life expectancy, but increases the level of
wages in the short term. Since the overall e￿ect of the epidemic is a lowered fertility rate and a
higher education, associated to a rise in wages, we can conclude that the ￿wage e￿ect￿ dominates
the ￿mortality e￿ect￿, bringing a clear answer to the ambiguity exempli￿ed by our theoretical
contribution.
One can ￿nally notice that the evolution of wages determines the opportunity costs of rearing
children and the quality-quantity trade-o￿ in the demand for children in a nearly self-sustaining
circle, since educational attainment will in￿uence the level of future wages. Higher wages trig-
gered by the spread of HIV epidemic leads to a lower fertility rate, more educational investment
in a lower number of children and in ￿ne higher wages. On the other hand, the low wages engen-
dered by chronic malaria prevalence lead to a high fertility rate, less educational investment in a
higher number of children and in ￿ne lower wages. In addition to the cognitive and learning ef-
fects of malaria, this vicious circle may explain why educational attainment remains persistently
low in countries chronically exposed to malaria. Finally, the positive but insigni￿cant impact of
malaria prevalence on fertility may re￿ect the stability of this infectious disease over time: after
a certain amount of time, the circular e￿ects of chronic malaria prevalence on wages disappear.
4 Conclusion
Theoretically, we demonstrated the existence of two opposite forces at work in the behavioral
answer of individuals to an epidemic shock, identi￿ed as the mortality and the wage e￿ects. The
key empirical ￿ndings of this paper then enable us to provide a clear answer to the a priori
ambiguous impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility and education. The rise in the wages triggered by
a similar but malaria-free country, over the 1965-1990 period.
31reduced labor supply dominates the negative impact of the epidemics on life expectancy, and
determines the HIV/AIDS behavioral consequences. Indeed, the increase in the opportunity
cost of rearing children prevails, and causes a reduction in fertility and a shift in the demand for
children towards quality instead of quantity. Opposite e￿ects are found in the case of malaria in
the long run, underlining the growth-detrimental e￿ects of this infectious disease. Overall, we
con￿rm the intuitions of Young (2005a) concerning the behavioral consequences of the HIV/AIDS
epidemics for a much broader sample of countries.
It is however worth noting that our results do not imply that the HIV/AIDS epidemics is
welfare-enhancing. Beyond the unfathomable e￿ects of the dramatic cost in human lives, one can
for example evoke the dire consequences of the growing number of orphans, and its detrimental
e￿ects on the level of inequalities in the economy (Boucekkine and La￿argue, 2007). However, our
purpose in this work was to focus on a careful study of the behavioral consequences of epidemics
such as HIV/AIDS, shedding light on the forces at play and their respective consequences, and
opening the ￿oor for use of such results in further studies on the overall economic impact of
epidemics.
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